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ABSTRACT
The Determinants of Financial Structure: Evidence 
From Chinese Listed Hospitality Companies
by
Hong Jiang
Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Although financial structure is crucial to company’s sustainable development, rarely any 
efforts have been made to investigate financial structure in a Chinese hospitality industry setting. 
This thesis first explores financial structure o f Chinese hospitality firms by using panel-data 
analysis.
All listed hospitality firms in China are included in the data sample. The study uses three 
methods to measure financial structure. They are total leverage ratio, long-term leverage ratio 
and short-term leverage ratio. Seven determinants, namely, firm size, growth, business risk, 
profitability, asset structure, listing years and state ownership structure are used to explain 
variations in leverage ratios. The result o f the regression analysis reveals that firms with great 
profits and high risk level rely less on debts. Short-term and total leverage ratios decrease with 
the variable o f firm size. Listing years impact firm’s long-term leverage ratio negatively.
It is obvious that conventional financial structure theories based on developed economies are 
applicable to Chinese hospitality companies, but their explanatory power is limited, given 
Chinese hospitality firms distinctive features.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
Study Background
China’s tourism industry is vigorously growing. In 2007, the domestic travelers reached 1.61 
billion, spending 777.06 billion Chinese Yuan with an average expenditure per capita of 482.6 
Chinese Yuan. The international tourist receipts ranked the seventh worldwide with a figure of 
25.74 billion US dollars in 2004. The figure jumped to 37.23 billion in 2007 with the 
international tourist arrivals of 45.08 million. In the recent five years, the inbound and domestic 
tourism compound growth rate is 13.8% and 12.1% respectively, even higher than the growth 
rate o f Chinese GDP (National Tourism Administration of the People’s Republic o f China 
[CNTA], 2008).
Closely related with tourism industry, hospitality firms in China are developing by leaps and 
bounds as well. Take lodging industry, a significant part of the hospitality industry, as an 
example. From 2000 to 2006, the number of star-rated hotels increased from 6029 to 12,751, an 
increase of 111%. In 2006, revenues of star-rated hotels are 148.29 billion Chinese Yuan, a 
growth o f 10.1% compared with the last year (CNTA, 2007). WTO forecasts China’s tourism 
industry will be the first in the world, accounting for 8.6% of total world market share by the 
year of 2020 (Ball, Homer, & Nield, 2007).
Financing is an inevitable concern for all Chinese hospitality companies in order to maintain
tremendous and sustainable development. Financing decisions are among the most critical 
decisions managers make (Keister, 2004). Financial structure choice is one important issue 
among financing decisions. It is defined by the mix or proportion of a firm’s financing 
represented by debt or equity (Van Home & Wachowicz, 2001). As a matter of fact, financial 
stmcture decisions are even more critical to hospitality firms, given the industry specific features. 
For example, lodging industry is very capital intensive. Compared with other industries, it 
requires more funding for land, building, fixture and equipment, and fumiture (Kim, 1995). 
Financial managers of lodging companies must opt for a reasonable financial stmcture so as to 
increase a firm’s value and simultaneously decrease its cost of capital (Van Home & Wachowicz, 
2001). Restaurant industry is risk intensive (Upneja & Dalbor, 2001). A restaurant firm may not 
be able to satisfy its obligation on excessive debt if  its debt rate is too high. On the other hand, 
financial managers o f restaurant firms are reluctant to pass by debt financing opportunities, since 
debt is the cheapest source of extemal capital (Kim, 1995).
With the establishment of various financial stmcture theories, numerous empirical research 
has been done to explore corporate financial stmcture. Most o f them try to identify determinants 
of firm’s financial stmcture (Huang & Song, 2006), because theories suggest that company 
selects financial stmcture relying on attributes that determine various benefits and costs 
associated with debt and equity financing (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Since all modem financial 
stmcture theories are established on the basis of US corporate financing strategies, most 
empirical studies aim to test the explanatory power of those theories in the background of 
developed economies. Titman and Wessels (1988) studied financial stmcture of 469 US 
manufacturing firms for a sampling period from 1974 to 1982 using factor-analytic technique.
Raj an and Zingales (1995) did financial structure research based on G-7 countries. Hence, our 
knowledge of corporate financing decisions has mostly been derived from developed economies, 
such as US and other G-7 countries (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001).
Financial structure in underdeveloped economies has been left unexplored until recently. 
Booth et al. (2001), after analyzing the financial structure of companies from 10 developing 
countries, demonstrated that conventional financial structure theories derived from developed 
economies work in developing countries as well, and factors affecting corporate financial 
structure are similar between developed and developing economies. Nonetheless, the influence 
o f those factors is not consistent through all countries. For instance, the variable of business risk 
positively influences leverage ratio in four countries, including Mexico, India, Jordan and 
Thailand, while it has reverse impact on leverage ratio of the other six countries in the sample 
data. Given different country of origin, determinants of leverage ratio exert influence in different 
manner. China is now in transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented 
economy, so the impacts of financial structure determinants in China could be distinctive as 
well.
Although Liu (1999), Chen (2004), Chen and Strange (2005) and Huang and Song (2006) 
have done some financial structure research studies in Chinese background, none o f them are 
specifically designed for the Chinese hospitality industry. However, financial structure varies 
greatly across different industry segments. Integrated oil companies, utility, chemical, 
transportation, telecommunications, forest products and real estate corporations rely heavily on 
debt financing (Myers, 2001). On the other hand, some high-tech firms, such as Merck and 
Hewlett-Packard, as well as some service firms, such as Automatic Data Processing and
Netscape and some major pharmaceutical firms are heavy equity users (Brealey, Myers, & 
Marcus, 1999). Titman and Wessels’ (1988) research studies confirm that companies in the same 
industry sector are more likely to have similar financial structure, since their business risks, 
profitability and asset structure are more comparable. Aggarwal (1981) underscores industry is 
the most important determinant of corporate financing. Liu’s (1999) research shows that industry 
classification has effect on Chinese company’s financial structure. He reveals that the more 
asset-intensive an industry, the more debts companies within the industry employ. Since the 
hospitality industry has many characteristics that differentiate it from other economic sectors, it 
is a must to analyze its financial structure individually.
Purpose of the Study
Hardly any study has been found done on the subject of financial structure o f Chinese 
hospitality firms, even though a thorough research is long overdue. The purpose of the thesis is 
to study the financial structure of Chinese hospitality companies by examining the determinants 
that impact firms’ financial structure decisions.
The study should shed some useful lights on the financial structure o f Chinese hospitality 
firms. Since investors tend to evaluate borrowing behavior of other firms within the same 
industry (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2004), this study should also be of particular importance and 
fascination for both domestic and international investors interested in investing in Chinese 
hospitality industry, providing them with status quo o f financial structure in Chinese hospitality 
firms.
Delimitation
The scope o f the paper is delimited by the following factors:
1. The study has only included public hospitality companies listed in mainland China as its 
sample set. Those companies have main business operations in lodging, restaurant or tourism 
sector. The time period covering by the study is from 2004 to 2006.
2. The study adopts three leverage ratios, namely, total, long-term and short-term debt ratios to 
measure a hospitality company’s financial structure. Seven key determinants, which is asset 
structure, profitability, business risk, firm size, growth, listing years and state ownership 
structure that have been proposed or demonstrated to be useful in explaining corporate 
financial structure variation by either theoretical or empirical studies, are tested in the 
research.
Structure of the Study
The roadmap of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, various strands of financial structure 
theories are revisited at first, including the seminal Modigliani and M iller’s (MM) theory 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958), the trade-off theory (Myers, 1977), the pecking order theory 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984), and the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Then past empirical 
research done in hospitality field and Chinese setting are reviewed. The dataset of the study, the 
outcome and predictor variables and the research methodology are discussed in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the findings of the empirical study. In Chapter 5, the 
conclusion, study implication, limitation, and the suggestion for future study are put forward.
Definition of Terms
1. Financial structure: details how a firm’s assets are financed. It is a mix or proportion of a 
firm’s short-term and long-term debts, preferred stock and common stock equity (Van Home & 
Wachowicz, 2001). It should be noted that financial structure is different from the widely used 
concept of capital structure, which only includes permanent and long-term financing. Financial 
structure is usually measured by total, long-term or short-term debt/leverage ratios.
2. CSRC code: industry classification established by China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). All sample companies in this study are defined by CSRC code K as social service firms, 
but fall into three different sub-sectors, which are hotel, restaurant and tourism.
3. Lodging firms: a group of firms which are defined by CSRC code K/ hotel with primary 
business operation area of providing lodging service for the general public.
4. Restaurant firms: a group o f firms which are defined by CSRC code K/ restaurant with 
primary business operation area o f providing food and beverage for on-premise or take-away 
consumption.
5. Tourism firms: a group of firms which are defined by CSRC code K/tourism with primary 
business operation area of inbound, domestic and outbound tourism, the development o f scenic 
spots or theme parks, and the development, manufacturing and sales o f tourism souvenirs.
6. Liability: an economic obligation payable to an individual or an organization outside the 
business. Short-term/current liability is due to be paid with cash, goods or services within one 
year or within the entity’s operating cycle if the cycle is longer than one year. Long-term liability 
is due to be paid with cash, goods or services over one year (Van Home & Wachowicz, 2001).
7. Asset structure: shows mix of a firm’s asset type (Van Home & Wachowicz, 2001). It is
usually measured by tangibility level, which is defined by the ratio of tangible assets (fixed 
assets plus inventory) to total assets.
8. Financial leverage: a firm’s use of fixed cost sources of financing, such as debt and preferred 
stock (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2004).
9. Business risk: also known as operating risk. It refers to uncertainty inherent in a firm’s 
operations. Its impact is shown in the volatility of a firm’s operating income (Brealey et al., 
1999).
10. Financial risk: is induced by the use of financial leverage. It refers to the added volatility in 
stockholders’ earnings and the risk o f possible bankruptcy (Brealey et ah, 1999).
11. Financial distress: occurs when a firm is unable to meet its financial obligations to make the 
required interest and principal payments. Financial distress costs arise from insolvency or 
distorted business decisions before insolvency (Brealey et ah, 1999).
12. Agency problem: refers to a potential conflict of interests between the agent (manager) and 
the principals (outside stockholders and creditors) (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2004).
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The most frequently mentioned financial structure theories are MM theory (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1958), trade-olf theory (Myers, 1977), pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984), and 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Even though none o f those established theories offer 
a general explanation for corporate financing strategies in the real world (Myers, 2001), they are 
all useful conditional theories which could at least help us understand a specific facet of 
corporate financing (Barclay & Smith, 2006).
This chapter first covers the four well established financial structure theories are revisited at 
first. Then, research studies regarding financial structure in hospitality companies are reviewed. 
Albeit there are many empirical investigations of financial structure, few of them are done in a 
Chinese setting. In the third part o f the chapter, studies in Chinese background are reviewed as 
well.
Theoretical Studies o f Financial Structure 
MM Theory
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958) pioneered the studies of financial structure. 
The underlying assumptions of MM theory are perfect capital market and no taxation. Under 
such circumstances, investors could borrow and lend by themselves on the same terms as firms.
so they would not pay extra for a levered firm which borrows on their behalf. MM theory 
contends that a corporation’s financial structure does not affect its value and its capital cost. 
Given that the total value of a firm depends only on its profitability and risk, it stays the same if 
those two factors do not alter (Van Home & Wachowicz, 2001).
Trade-off Theory
The policy of financial stmcture does matter, for the real capital market, however, is far 
from perfect. This explains why actual leverage ratio does not differ from firm to firm and from 
industry to industry in a random way. Firms in dmgs, instmments, electronics and food 
industries are low leverage users, while companies in paper, steel, airlines and cement are heavy 
leverage users (Brealey, Myers, & Marcus, 1999). Tax benefits and financial distress costs affect 
a firm’s financing choices. Financial managers always try to strike a balance between the 
benefits and costs o f debt financing. Trade-off theory suggests there is an optimal leverage ratio, 
at which the present value o f tax shield on additional debt is just offset by the increase in the 
present value of financial distress cost (Myers, 2001 ).
Unlike dividends, interests paid by corporation are tax-deductible. Tax shield, the term for 
tax savings, can be calculated by interest expense multiplying tax rate. This is a major advantage 
brought by debt financing. A levered company can distribute more to creditors and stock holders 
compared with an un-levered one with same revenues (Van Home & Wachowicz, 2001). In 
essence, the govemment subsidizes the levered firm for its use o f debt. However, personal 
income tax somewhat lowers tax-shield benefits, but does not necessarily eliminate them 
(Brigham & Gapenski, 1991), since equity holders are taxed at a lower tax rate on capital gains 
and can defer tax payments until capital gains are realized (Barclay & Smith, 2006).
Despite the implication of the tax shield benefits that a firm should borrow to a hilt to 
maximize its value, hardly any company adopts such financing policy, because an extremely 
high debt ratio increases financial risks and financial distress costs as a result. Financial distress 
costs have negative impact on a firm’s value. The costs o f financial distress consist o f insolvency 
costs or costs o f distorted business decisions before insolvency. Legal and administrative costs 
are directly associated with bankruptcy, including forced sale of assets at below-market prices, 
attorney fees, court fees and accounting costs (Brealey et al., 1999). In most cases, direct costs 
only account for a very small proportion of the total pre-bankruptcy value of a firm (Brealey et 
al., 1999). Although costs o f distorted business decisions before bankruptcy are hard to measure, 
they are even more critical. Employees, customers and suppliers alter their actions when a firm 
is on the brink of bankruptcy. Employees start job hopping; customers worry if the firm could 
honor its warranties any longer and suppliers are not willing to deliver unless they could receive 
cash (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2004). Further, the management is also obliged to make decisions 
which help ensure the survival of the eompany to the detriment of its long-term growth. For 
instance, firms slash R&D, training and maintenance expenses, because these costs do not 
contribute to instant returns (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2004).
Pecking Order Theory 
Those successful industry giants. Ford Motor Co., Procter & Gamble and Microsoft, all 
operate at very low leverage level. As a matter of fact, the most profitable companies in a given 
industry are found to borrow the least (Myers, 2001). Pecking order theory suggests that a firm 
has hierarchical preference for financial resources. A firm prefers to finance in the following 
order: retained earnings and depreciation generated funds, debt financing and new common
10
equity (Brealey et al., 1999).
Outside investors can hardly, if not impossible, access a firm’s operational or financial 
information as inside managers do. Issuing new debts releases the news that the management has 
confidence in the firm’s future profits and cash flows. On the other hand, issuing new equity 
conveys the information that the company’s stocks have been overvalued, for the management 
attempt to issue the overvalued security to maximize the benefits for existing shareholders 
(Barclay & Smith, 2006). Consequently, increasing debt financing signal positive sign, whereas 
issuing equity is regarded as a bad omen. On average, stock prices drop 3% after firms announce 
new equity offerings (Barclay & Smith, 2006), while there is negligible impact on stock prices 
when companies use debt financing (Myers, 2001). The drop in stock prices is regarded as 
information costs (Barclay & Smith, 2006). Obviously, the information costs of debt are less 
than that o f equity.
The pecking order theory implies that financial managers would automatically choose the 
cheapest available financing sources. The more profitable a company, the less the company 
borrows, for it can draw on its internal equity for future development without incurring any 
information or issuing costs (Barclay & Smith, 2006). Here is some evidence o f financing in US 
enterprises endorsing the pecking order theory. In most years, extemal financing accounts for 
less than 20% of investment funds, and most o f them are debts. In 1999, internal cash flow 
financed $805 billion out o f $944 billion investment in US non-farm, non-financial firms. 
Extemal financing covered the rest, which was $139 billion. However, the borrowing was $283 
billion and the equity financing was negative $144 billion (Myers, 2001).
11
Agency Theory
Agency problem emerges, because perfect alignment of interests of managers, creditors and 
shareholders are implausible in practice (Barclay & Smith, 2006).
Equity holders would vote for riskier operation or investment tactics and strategies, 
especially when the company is in danger o f bankruptcy, since they are residual claimers. They 
tend to gamble at the expense o f debt holders. Upside gains all accrue to stockholders, while 
creditors would not be able to enjoy any extra gains, since they typically receive fixed interest 
and principal. Since managers have the incentive to act in the only interest of stockholders at the 
expense of lenders, restrictive contractual agreements are imposed on the management by 
creditors. Those agreements limit the management decision authority, resulting in suboptimal 
investment and operation decisions. For instance, a firm may be forbidden to invest in particular 
economic segments (Brealey et ah, 1999). The managers are monitored to ensure that they 
comply with protective covenants in loan agreements. Monitoring could be done through 
auditing financial statements and supervising by independent directors (Barclay & Smith, 2006). 
Monitoring cost together with the cost of suboptimal investment and operation decisions 
constitute agency costs. When the debt level is low, the agency costs are immaterial. With the 
growth o f the amount o f debts, agency costs become significant. Agency costs tend to rise at an 
increasing rate with debt, and lower the corporation’s value as a result (Brealey et ah, 1999). The 
presence of agency costs discourages a firm from borrowing, especially beyond a prudent level.
Agency theory also suggests the potential underinvestment problem (Barclay & Smith, 
2006). A company with high leverage is more likely to pass up profitable investment 
opportunities than a company with low level of debts. New equity holders understand that the
12
value created or preserved by their investments would be used to restore creditors’ position. 
Accordingly, incredibly high equity issuing eosts would oblige managers to give up profitable 
investment plans. Even existing share holders would utilize their voting rights to let the 
company forgo new investments, even if they are proved to be profitable. Because onee the 
projects fall apart, the company would face the threat o f debt default or even bankruptcy 
(Barclay & Smith, 2006).
On the other hand, the agency problem between managers and shareholders arises, when 
managers of firms with substantial free eash flow and limited growth opportunities squander 
money on “empire building”, over-investing in core business, or even diversifying their 
businesses by acquisition into unfamiliar ones (Narayanan & Nanda, 2004). All those actions 
decrease a firm’s value. Despite a variety o f methods to reduce excessive free cash flow, for 
instance, paying higher dividends or stock repurchases, the most efficient way is to substitute 
more debts for equity (Brigham & Houston, 2002). Therefore, in order to deerease the ageney 
eosts between shareholders and managers, it is advisable to inerease firm’s leverage ratio. 
Interest payments are eontractual. If  they are not realized, the company will default on debts or 
go bankrupt. Given that, managers would be more disciplined.
Empirical Studies o f Financial Structure 
Corporate Finaneial Structure Studies Within the Hospitality Industry 
Kim’s (1995) study is a comprehensive panel data research done on the subject o f financial 
structure in the hospitality industry. He based his study o f corporate financing decisions on the 
data source o f 251 restaurant companies and 81 lodging firms in US from 1986 to 1992, whose
13
financial information was available in the Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT PC Plus Database.
Three measures were used to represent financial structure, the dependent variable. They 
were long-term, short-term and total debt to market value equity ratio. Attributes, such as firm 
size, earning volatility, profitability, growth opportunity, non-debt tax shield, and asset structure, 
were used to explain a firm’s financial structure. The author employed several measurements for 
each independent variables mentioned above. For instance, firm size was defined as natural log 
of sales revenue and natural log of total assets. Further, the author also combined some 
industry-specific variables that had never been analyzed before into his multiple regression 
models. The variable of franchising was included in the model for restaurant industry. It was 
measured by the number of franchised properties to total number of properties. The dummy 
variable of management company was included in the model for lodging industry. It was coded 
as “ 1” if it is a management company or franchisor and “0” if otherwise.
Ordinary least squares (OLS thereafter) regression was run. The results revealed that 
conventional financial structure theories have strong explanatory power in US hospitality 
industry. The variables of asset structure, represented by the tangibility level, has strong positive 
relation with total leverage ratio of both hotel and restaurant industry. The variable of 
profitability, on the other hand, has strong negative impact on the total debt ratio. The study also 
demonstrated that a growing hospitality company relies less on debt financing. The variables of 
franchising and management company do not seem to be significant factors influencing a 
hospitality firm’s leverage ratio.
Upneja and Dalbor (2001) addressed the financial structure of US restaurant industry in 
their paper. In their empirical model, total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio and short-term debt
14
ratio were adopted to study the financial structure decisions of all listed restaurants in US. The 
authors determined the estimate of Ohlson’s 0-seore (a measure of the probability of 
bankxuptey), operating eash flow, the number of years the restaurant firm listed in the 
COMPUSTAT database, and the interaetion variable between operating eash flow and the 
number of years the firm had been listed in the COMPUSTAT database as attributes whieh 
would influenee a firm’s finaneial strueture.
Contrary to the author’s expeetation, operating eash flow, the proxy for growth, has a 
signifieantly positive effeet on total debt ratio. Besides, firm listing years are also signifieant and 
positively related to total debt. However, the interaetion variable between those two faetors was 
found to be signifieantly negatively related to the debt ratio, whieh eorroborates the previous 
expeetation. The results of the regression model for long-term debt are similar to those o f the 
total debt ratio model, whereas the findings for the short-term model somewhat deviate. 
Operating cash flow is significant and negatively related to the short-term debt. Neither the 
listing years nor the interaetion variable is signifieant.
In another researeh paper, Dalbor and Upneja (2002) speeifieally designed pooled 
regression model to investigate the relation between the amount o f long-term debt and its 
determinants in a US restaurant firms setting. These determinants ineluded growth opportunity, 
firm size, probability of bankxuptey and effective tax rate of the firm. All variables have strong 
impaet on restaurant eompanies’ long-term borrowing with effeetive tax rate as an exeeption.
The authors argued that small firms are not able to pay substantial fixed eost o f long-term debts, 
so they opt for short-term debts, therefore there exist a positive relation between firm size and 
long-term debts. Moreover, firms with greater insolveney probability have limited aeeess to
15
equity market, and they have to turn to long-term borrowing to finance their long-term growth.
Corporate Financial Structure Studies in a Chinese Setting 
Liu ( 1999) used a data set of all companies listed on two national stock exchanges, namely, 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, to study the corporate financial structure in China. Liu 
collected data from financial statements during 1992 to 1997. The sample companies came from 
five industries, which were manufacturing, trade, utility, real estate and conglomerates.
Liu (1999) adopted determinants of industry classification, firm size, profitability, 
tangibility level and growth rate of assets to explain corporate financial structure in China. Most 
factors were found to have similar impact on Chinese financial structure as they do in developed 
economies. For example, size and tangibility level are positively related with debt ratio, whereas 
profitability impacts debt ratio negatively. Yet, the empirical results revealed that the rate of 
growth of assets is positively related to the debt ratio, which is contradictory to evidence in 
developed economies.
The innovative point of Liu’s study is that he incorporated the variable of ownership 
structure into the study. After analyzing extant financial structure theories and empirical 
evidence as well as the Chinese business environment, the author proposed three hypotheses 
regarding ownership structure; percentage of shares held by individual investors was supposed 
to have no significant effect on leverage ratio; percentage of state shares was supposed to have 
positive effect on leverage ratio and percentage of legal person shares was supposed to have 
negative effect on leverage ratio. Yet, the results o f OLS regression did not support the author’s 
hypotheses. Though there is a consistent positive relation between percentage of state shares and 
debt ratio, and consistent negative relation between legal person shares and debt ratio, the results
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are not significant. This could be explained by that the author used long-term debt ratio to 
measure financial structure, while long-term debt accounted for only about 6% of total debt 
according to the study.
Huang and Song (2006) used a new data base, the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research Database (CSMAR), to analyze the financial structure of 1200 publicly traded 
companies in China. After running OLS regression, three ways of robustness analysis, namely, 
balanced, consolidated and first difference methods, were employed to check the stability of the 
relation between leverage ratios and the explanatory variables.
Except for some normally tested indicators, such as profitability, tangibility, tax, firm size, 
non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and volatility, the research also encompassed 
institutional shareholdings and managerial shareholdings as independent variables. Institutional 
shareholdings were the proxy of the ownership structure and were defined as shares hold by 
institutional investors to total outstanding shares. Managerial shareholdings were defined as the 
number of shares held by top management divided by the total number of outstanding shares. 
The results of the study shows profitability, growth rate and non-debt tax shields have strong 
negative influence on the corporate financial structure, while firm size has positive impact. The 
indicator of institutional shareholdings was found to have no significant effect on book or 
market value total debt ratio. Managerial shareholdings, in contrast, are significantly negatively 
related with total debt ratio. Their study also revealed that Chinese firms have lower leverage, 
especially lower long-term leverage, compared with firms from G-7 countries.
Nonetheless, Chen and Strange (2005) argued the reason why ownership concentration was 
not found a significant variable in financial structure model was that Huang and Song only took
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into consideration a limited range of ownership structure.
Chen and Strange (2005) used a sample set of 972 corporations listed on either Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Market in 2003 to explore the determinants of financial structure in the Chinese 
market. They classified institutional shareholders into three categories, namely, state agencies, 
state-owned institutions and domestic institutions. According to the author’s definition, “state 
agencies are government organizations exerting the functions of shareholders on behalf o f the 
state; state-owned institutions are entities controlled by governments at various hierarchic levels, 
and domestic institutions, are standalone entities set up by mixed groups o f shareholders” (Chen 
& Strange, 2005, p. 12). The results showed the percentage o f shares hold by state agencies and 
state-owned institutions have significantly negative impact on market value debt ratio, showing 
that Chinese state shareholders attempt to avoid debt financing.
The authors also tested the independent variable o f listing years on the stock market. The 
variable impacts leverage ratios in contradictory ways. It has significantly positive relation with 
the book value debt ratio, but negative relation with market value debt ratio, yet not significant. 
In contrast to the evidence in developed economies, business risks are positively related to both 
book value and market value debt ratios. Given that China has its unique institutional features, 
the result is not perplexing. Bankruptcy costs are low in China, especially for state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs thereafter) for two reasons. First, the bankruptcy legislation is underdeveloped 
with weak enforcement. Besides, currently, SOEs still remain to be the backbone o f the 
economy employing a great number o f workforces. In order to maintain economic and social 
stability, the government always comes to rescue once SOE is on the brink o f bankruptcy. Given 
one salient feature o f the Chinese economy that 80% listed companies were used to be SOEs
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(Riedel, Jin, & Gao, 2007) and the state become the major shareholder after SOEs being 
corporatised, bankruptcy should not be an issue for most listed firms. Consequently, those firms 
are stimulated to resort to more debt financing, despite the high probability of bankruptcy.
The financial statements of Dow-China 88 Index covering a period from 1995 to 2000 was 
employed by Chen (2004) to test the explanatory power of western model of financial structure 
in China. After eliminating firms from bank, insurance and investment industries, the final 
sample contained 77 companies. The relationship between book value total and long-term debt 
ratios with profitability, firm size, growth opportunities, tangibility, earnings volatility and 
non-debt tax shields was tested. The author utilized three methods, which were pooled OLS, 
fixed effects and random effects, to draw the conclusion.
The empirical evidence shows that leverage ratio decreases when profitability increases.
The author highlighted that the new pecking order theory explains the relation. Retained 
earnings are Chinese firms first option of financing source, equity financing the second and debt 
financing is their last resort. Managers seek relative dependence on debt as opposed to equity for 
two reasons. First, the capital gain in the stock secondary market is substantial with trading 
prices usually 6 to 8 times higher than IPO prices (Chen, 2004). Besides, Chinese managers 
have a mindset that capital funds from equity market are free money and can be squandered with 
relative impunity (Roche, 2005), while debt financing is binding. Non-existence of shareholder 
protection legislation and poor corporate governance, which are, unfortunately, not uncommon 
in transitional economies, such as China, encourage the extensive use o f non-binding equity 
financing.
Opposed to the common expectation that growth opportunities would have a negative effect
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on a firm’s debt ratio, the relationship is positive in China’s case. The author proposed two 
explanations. First of all, the Chinese banks recognize the growth opportunity value. Bank loans 
are more accessible to companies with great growth opportunities. Second, most listed firms are 
in heavy industry sectors, which have more tangible assets and less growth chances. Tangibility 
level has positive influence on leverage ratio. The relationship between size and debt ratio 
remains ambiguous, for there is a positive relation between size and total debt ratio, but a 
reverse relation between size and long-term debt ratio. The study suggested that Chinese firms 
employ more short-term debts than long-term ones. As a matter o f fact, the study showed the 
average long-term book debt ratio is only 7% in China.
Table 1 summarizes the findings of financial structure empirical research covered in the 
literature review.
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Table 1
Summary o f Findings o f Previous Empirical Research Studies
Indicators Kim UD DU Liu HS CS Chen
Size +*** +* +**/- +***/. +/.***
Profitability +!-*** _** _*** _*** _***
Business risk +/- +/- +*** +/-*
Asset structure 
(Tangibility)
+ *** +** + *** - + ***
Listing years +* +***/-
Growth _*** +*/.* + _*** _!_** + ***
State ownership + +/.***
Note. The studies are from Kim (1995), Upneja and Dalbor (2001) which is denoted as UD, 
Dalbor and Upneja (2002) which is denoted as DU, Liu (1999), Chen and Strange (2005) which 
is denoted as CS, Huang and Song (2006) which is denoted as HS, and Chen (2003). Empty cell 
indicates that the specific study did not include the certain indicator. “+” means that leverage 
increases with the variable, and “-“means that leverage decreases with the variable.
* p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION
The purpose of the research is to explore the corporate financial structure of Chinese listed 
hospitality firms by studying determinants o f financial leverage ratios. The research studies all 
hospitality companies listed on Chinese stock markets using ordinary least squares (OLS 
thereafter) regression analysis, the most widely used technique by previous relevant research 
studies (Kim, 1995; Liu, 1999; Upneja & Dalbor, 2001).
Three regression models are built for total leverage ratio, long-term leverage ratio and 
short-term leverage ratio separately. Seven determinants are employed to explain the variation in 
leverage ratios. They are asset structure, business risk, profitability, growth, firm size, listing 
years and state ownership structure. Since the last variable of state ownership structure have 
been seldom used as independent variables in financial structure studies, except for Liu ( 1999) 
and Chen and Strange’s (2005) studies, this study extend the range o f determinants suggested by 
previous theoretical and empirical research. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) highlight since 
different groups o f shareholders have various financial goals and priorities, contextual variables 
such as ownership structure should be included into any analysis of financial structure.
Data Sources
In the paper, all hospitality companies listed in mainland China’s stock markets are
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employed as the dataset. Currently, there are 24 hospitality companies publicly traded in China. 
Among them, 14 are listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and 10 on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE). In the sample set, five companies are in lodging industry, two companies 
operate restaurant business and the remaining seventeen companies are within tourism industry. 
This is a quite small dataset compared with it in developed economies, such as US. According to 
Kim (1995), there were 251 restaurant companies and 81 hotel companies listed on US stock 
markets in 1992.
Two types o f shares circulate in mainland China. A-shares are traded by Chinese Yuan and 
sold mainly to Chinese domestic investors. B-shares are traded by US dollars or HK dollars and 
can be purchased by both domestic and foreign investors. In the sample set, four firms own both 
A and B shares, and one firm only issues B shares.
Companies’ consolidated annual reports from 2004 to 2006 are the main data source for the 
study, which are available in Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) official website. Unconsolidated reports are not adopted because companies tend to 
include subsidiaries’ equity in the reports, but not their liabilities, thus leading to statistical bias. 
Further, consolidated financial reports eliminate the impact of intra-company transactions, which 
inflate revenues and profits of parent companies (Madan, 2007). Since Li Jiang YuLong Tourism 
Co., Ltd was listed in 2004, so its 2004 consolidated annual report is not available. KunMing 
Horti-Expo Garden Co., Ltd was listed in 2006, so its consolidated annual reports are not 
available for year 2004 and 2005. China QuanJuDe (Group) Co., Ltd and Jinling Hotel 
Corporation, Ltd were listed in 2007, so their consolidated annual reports are not available for 
year 2004 and 2005.
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Table 2 lists all sample companies’ trading locations, names, share codes and industry 
classification.
Table 2
A List o f Sample Hospitality Corporations
No. Name of the company Share code 
(A/B shares)
Industry
classification
Shenzhen Stock Exchange
1 Shenzhen Century Plaza 
Hotel Co., Ltd
000033 CSRC code K/hotel
2 Shenzhen Overseas 
Chinese Town Holding 
Co., Ltd
000069 CSRC code K/tourism
3 Hunan Huatian Great Hotel 
Co., Ltd
000428 CSRC code K/hotel
4 Zhang Jia Jie Tourism 
Development Co., Ltd
000430 CSRC code K/tourism
5 Guangzhou Dongfang 
Hotel Co., Ltd
000524 CSRC code K/hotel
6 X i’an Tourism Co., Ltd 000610 CSRC code K/tourism
7 Hainan Dadonghai Tourism 
Center (Holdings) Co., Ltd
000613/200613 CSRC code K/tourism
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Table 2 (continued)
No. Name of the company Share code 
(A/B shares)
Industry
classification
Shenzhen Stock Exchange
8 X i’an Catering Co., Ltd 000721 CSRC code K/restaurant
9 Beijing Jingxi Tourism 
Development Co., Ltd
000802 CSRC code K/tourism
10 Emei Shan Tourism Co., Ltd 000888 CSRC code K/tourism
11 Guilin Tourism Co., Ltd 000978 CSRC code K/tourism
12 LiJiang YuLong Tourism 
Co., Ltd
002033 CSRC code K/tourism
13 KunMing Horti-Expo 
Garden Co., Ltd
002059 CSRC code K/tourism
14 China QuanJuDe (Group) 
Co., Ltd
002186 CSRC code K/restaurant
Shanghai Stock Exchange
15 Huangshan Toursim 
Development Co., Ltd
600054/900942 CSRC code K/tourism
16 China CYTS Tours Holding 
Co., Ltd
600138 CSRC code K/tourism
17 Beijing Capital Tourism Co., 
Ltd
600258 CSRC code K/tourism
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Table 2 (continued)
No. Name o f the company Share code 
(A/B shares)
Industry
classification
Shanghai Stock Exchange
18 China United Travel Co., Ltd 600358 CSRC code K/tourism
19 Dalian Sunaisa Tourism 
Holdings Co., Ltd
600593 CSRC code K/tourism
20 Shanghai Jin Jiang 
International Industrial 
Investment Co., Ltd
600650/900914 CSRC code K/tourism
21 Tibet Shengdi Co., Ltd 600749 CSRC code K/tourism
22 Shanghai Jin Jiang 
International Hotels 
Development Co., Ltd
600754/900934 CSRC code K/hotel
23 Jinling Hotel Corporation, 
Ltd.
601007 CSRC code K/hotel
24 Shanghai Jinjiang 
International Travel Co., Ltd
/900929 CSRC code K/tourism
Note. Information derived from Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) or Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) official websites.
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OLS Regression Analysis and Variables
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is the most widely adopted technique in studying 
corporate financial structure. Following Kim (1995), Liu (1999) and Upneja and Dalbor’s (2001) 
research, this paper uses OLS analysis to study the financial structure of Chinese listed 
hospitality firms. The multiple regression model is built as follows: 
y  = P\^\ + Pl^l + + Pl^l + ^
Where:
Y stands for total leverage ratio, long-term leverage ratio or short-term leverage ratio, and 
, Y j , , A j , Ag, A , represents asset structure, profitability, business risk, firm size,
growth, listing years and state ownership structure respectively. Both predictor variables and 
outcome variables are discussed in further detail later.
= constant or regression coefficient of independent variables 
(i= 0 ,1 ,2 , 3 ,4 , 5 ,6 ,7 )
^ = error term
Every dependent and independent variable is calculated for three years from 2004 to 2006. 
Each year’s value is counted as one observation for the regression analysis. Given that 
consolidated annual reports are not available for each firm every year, the total observations of 
each variable for analysis is 65.
Dependent Variables
In this paper, financial structure is measured by book value total leverage ratio, long-term 
leverage ratio and short-term leverage ratio. Total leverage ratio is defined as book value total 
liabilities divided by book value total liabilities plus book value of equity. Long-term and
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short-term leverage ratios are obtained when book value total liabilities are replaced by book 
value long-term liabilities and book value short-term liabilities.
Albeit there is no consensus on whether book or market value is more appropriate 
measurement for financial structure, given the high volatility of Chinese stock market and the 
high proportion o f state-owned untradeable shares, it has been argued that book value should be 
a better method (Tong & Green, 2005). Further, financial managers design financial structure 
based more on company’s book value (Chen & Strange, 2005). Also, using liabilities to measure 
financial structure has its own strengths. First o f all, companies check liabilities rather than debts 
only when they intend to increase leverage financing. In addition, accounts payable should be 
included when measuring leverage ratio, since they are quite often used by many Chinese firms 
as a means of financing (Huang & Song, 2006). In the study, short-term leverage ratio is adopted 
as a measurement for financial structure as well, because Chinese firms tend to use more 
short-term debt financing than long-term one (Liu, 1999; Chen, 2004).
Proposed Independent Variables and Hvnotheses 
The independent variables o f asset structure, profitability, business risk, firm size, growth, 
listing years and state ownership structure are included in this study. All those predictor 
variables are proposed or proved to have strong impacts on corporate financial structure by 
previous theoretical or empirical financial structure studies.
Asset Structure (TANG)
According to financial structure theories, types of assets influence a firm’s financial 
structure in some way (Titman & Wessels, 1988). The trade-off theory suggests firm with fixed 
assets to use more debt financing, because it has the option o f issuing secured debts to decrease
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the probability o f  financial distress. Firms with tangible assets that can serve as collateral are 
supposed to have preferred access to debt financing, because collateral reduces creditors’ risks, 
especially in the event of bankruptcy. Once facing the circumstance o f bankruptcy, companies 
with higher proportion of intangible assets are more vulnerable to value losses. On the opposite, 
tangible assets can tide over the process o f bankruptcy largely unscathed. Procter & Gamble, 
whose profits are mostly generated by intangible assets, always operate at low debt ratio 
(Brealey et al., 1999). Issuing debts secured by assets with known value by outside investors 
eliminate costs associated with information asymmetry (Phillips & Sipahioglu, 2004; Supanvanij, 
2006; Titman & Wessels, 1988). It is suggested that a firm with higher tangibility level should 
take this advantage to issue more debts. Further, managers are likely to be more discreet about 
allotting capital when debts are collateralized (Kim, 1995), thereby largely lowering the agency 
costs between managers and stakeholders. This could be another incentive to increase leverage 
ratio.
Tong and Green (2005) analyzed corporate financial structure o f China’s top 50 public 
corporations using firm-level panel data for the period o f 2001 to 2003. They found a firm with 
more fixed assets tends to borrow more. Supanvanij (2006) employed the data sample o f 292 
Asian firms from Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan and 
Philippines. They reported a highly positive correlation between tangibility level and book value 
long-term and short-term leverage ratios. Also, Chen (2004) found a positive relation between 
long-term debt and firm’s tangibility level.
Firm’s tangibility level, in this study, acts as the proxy of its asset structure. The study 
defines asset tangibility level as the ratio of tangible assets (fixed assets plus inventory) to total
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assets, following Supanvanij’s (2006) approach.
Hypothesis 1 : Tangibility level is hypothesized to be positively related to the leverage ratio 
of listed Chinese hospitality firms.
Profitability (PROF)
Pecking order theory (Brealey et al., 1999) highlights that a firm only resorts to external 
financing when its internal funds are exhausted or not adequate. It indicates that profitability 
negatively impacts debt ratio. Internal financing is the most economic and easiest source of 
capital, for issuing debts and equity involves substantial issuance costs and information costs. 
Besides, in China, the firm must meet strict criteria formulated by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC thereafter), the institution in charge of the stock market in China, before 
seeking new stock issuance. According to CSRC, the firm could only apply for new equity 
issuance, if  its annual return on net assets is higher than 10% for the recent three accounting 
period.
Macas Nunes and Serrasqueiro’s (2007) and Raj an and Zingales’ (1995) studies strongly 
endorse the theoretical assumption. Krishnan and Moyer (1997) explored the financial structure 
of firms from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Korea and reported the same result.
This study applies Raj an and Zingales’ (1995) and Liu’s (1999) approach using operating 
income to total assets as the measurement for profitability.
Hypothesis 2: The relation between profitability and leverage ratio is hypothesized to be 
negative for publicly traded hospitality firms in China.
Business Risk (Risk)
The trade-off theory implies a firm with relatively high business risks is not supposed to rely
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heavily on debt financing, for the company has higher probability of bankruptcy and may not be 
able to generate adequate revenues to cover its fixed contractual interest costs due to volatility in 
earnings. Creditors opt for avoiding firms with high business risk, or they would demand high 
compensation for undertaking extra risk, thus increasing companies borrowing costs.
Empirical studies by Friend and Lang (1988) and Walsh and Ryan (1997) reveal that 
business risks and debt ratio are inversely correlated. Delcoure’s (2007) research focused on 
financial structure of transitional economies. The author studied firms from Poland, Russia, 
Czech Republic and Slovakia Republic, and revealed in Russia, business risk is negatively 
related with firm’s debt ratios, yet the result is not significant. Huang and Song (2006) spotted 
the negative relation between business risk and market value total debt ratio as well.
In Chen’s (2004) study, business risk is defined by absolute value o f percentage change in 
operating income each year. This research follows Chen’s (2004) approach.
Hypothesis 3; Business risk is hypothesized to be negatively related to the leverage ratio for 
listed Chinese hospitality firms.
Firm Size (SIZE)
Firm size is consistently found to be correlated with a firm’s debt ratio (Titman & Wessels, 
1988). Large firms are more diversified in terms of products and services and less likely to go 
default or bankruptcy (Supanvanij, 2006). Not surprisingly, firm size is always regarded as the 
inverse proxy o f bankruptcy probability. Consequently, large firms are expected to rely more on 
debt financing as expected by the trade-off theory. Usually, large firms request more funds, so 
they would have bargaining power over banks to arrange a lower interest rate (Eriotis, Vasiliou, 
& Ventoura-Neokosmidi, 2007). Besides, large firms could enjoy economies o f scale in terms of
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debt issuance cost.
Macacs Nunes and Serrasqueiro’s (2007) research report a significant positive relationship 
between firm’s size and total leverage ratio. Tong and Green (2005) found the same result in the 
research o f listed Chinese firms.
Following Krishnan and Moyer (1999) and Chen and Strange (2005), the study uses the 
natural logarithm of total assets as the indicator for firm size. This measurement could reduce 
outlier effect brought by extremely large or small corporations (Kim, 1995).
Hypothesis 4: Firm size is hypothesized to be positively related with leverage ratio in the 
Chinese hospitality setting.
Growth (GROW)
As suggested by the agency theory, managers are prone to expropriate wealth from debt 
holders. The agency costs are even higher for a growing company for it has more diverse 
investment opportunities (Phillips & Sipahioglu, 2004), therefore creditors would require strict 
contractual agreement to limit the firm’s investment behavior. A growing firm, however, would 
borrow less so as to enjoy more flexibility in terms of investment (Supanvanij, 2006). In 
addition, growth opportunities are intangible assets that can not be collateralized, and they do 
not generate instant returns (Titman & Wessels, 1988). The fact may reinforce the hypothesis 
that there is a negative relation between growth and leverage ratio.
Long and Malitz (1985) regarded advertising and R&D spending as the proxy of growth, 
and revealed that it has a strong negative influence on a firm’s borrowing. Eriotis, Vasiliou and 
Ventoura-Neokosmidi (2007) investigated financial structure by using panel data derived from 
financial statements of 129 companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. The authors used
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annual change in earnings to proxy growth and found it has strong negative impact on total 
leverage ratio. The authors argued high growth implies high variation in earnings and in turn 
high risks. Creditors would require high returns for bearing extra risks, which make debt capital 
more expensive. Supanvanij (2006) affirmed that a growing company would borrow less.
This study uses the growth o f total assets to measure firm’s growth. Following Titman and 
Wessels (1988) and Liu (1999), the growth o f total assts is defined by the percentage change in 
total assets each year.
Hypothesis 5: The relation between growth and leverage ratio is hypothesized to be negative 
for Chinese listed hospitality firms.
Listing Years (AGE)
The age of publicly traded companies measured by their listing years is supposed to be an 
important factor influencing corporate financial structure choices. The longer the firm listed, the 
more investors know about the company and the less the information asymmetry costs. If the 
company has a history of making prudent investment, it would have preferred access to debt 
resources with lower required rate of return.
Diamond ( 1989) brought to light that older firms issue more debts than their younger 
counterparts. In Upneja and Dalbor’s (2001) study, they reported debt financing is more 
accessible for firms with long listing years. Chen and Strange (2005) confirmed the conclusion 
is also valid in China.
The study employs listing years on stock market as the indicator of firm’s age as in Chen 
and Strange (2005).
Hypothesis 6: Firm’s listing years are hypothesized to be positively related to the leverage
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ratio for listed Chinese hospitality firms.
State Ownership Structure (STATE)
China’s financial system is a system dominated by the banking sector and a banking sector 
dominated by the government (Riedel, Jin, & Gao, 2007). The big four state-owned commercial 
banks. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, Agriculture Bank 
o f China and Bank o f China, account for 70% of total bank lending (Roche, 2005). The 
government intervenes in their lending practices heavily and it is the ultimate creditor indeed. 
Berger and Udell (1994) suggests that a close relationship with creditors could substitute for 
physical collateral involved in lending practices, because creditors could closely monitor the 
firm, and thereby reduce information asymmetry. A high percentage of state-owned shares 
indicates a close relationship between the firm and the government. So, the firm would have the 
impetus to borrow more with fewer costs. Company hold more state shares has high leverage 
ratio as found by Liu’s ( 1999) research, although the finding is not statistically significant.
The proportion o f state-owned shares to total company shares is the indicator of state 
ownership structure in the study. Two types o f shares constitute state-owned shares. One is state 
shares hold by state agencies, who manage state-owned assets on behalf o f the government. For 
example, state-owned asset supervision and administration commission or its provincial 
branches. The other is state legal person shares, which are cross hold by other state-owned 
enterprises.
Hypothesis 7: The relation between the percentage o f state-owned shares o f Chinese 
publicly traded hospitality firm and its leverage ratio is hypothesized to be positive.
Table 3 gives seven independent variables, their measurements and expected signs.
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Table 3
Independent Variables’ Measurements and Expected Signs
Independent variable Measurement Expected sign
Asset structure (TANG) Tangible assets
(Fixed assets + inventory)/ total assets
+
Profitability (PROF) Operating income/ total assets -
Business risk (RISK) Absolute value o f annual percentage
change in operating income
Firm size (SIZE) Natural log o f total assets +
Growth rate (GROW) Annual percentage change in total 
assets
-
Listing years (AGE) Company’s listing years in stock market +
State ownership structure
State-owned shares
(STATE)
(state shares + state legal person 
shares)/total shares
+
Note. “+” means that leverage increases with the variable, and “-“means that leverage decreases 
with the variable.
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CHAPTER4 
DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter reports and analyzes the empirical evidence based on the sample o f all listed 
hospitality firms. In the first section, the descriptive statistics o f dependent and independent 
variables are described. The second section examines the results o f Pearson correlation analysis. 
In the last section, the findings o f ordinary least squares (OLS thereafter) regression analysis are 
presented and discussed.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for outcome variables (total leverage ratio, long-term leverage ratio 
and short-term leverage ratio) and predictor variables (asset structure, profitability, business risk, 
firm size, growth, listing years and state ownership structure) are shown in the Table 4. In the 
table, TD denotes total leverage ratio, LTD denotes long-term leverage ratio and STD denotes 
short-term leverage ratio. TANG denotes asset structure, PROF denotes profitability, RISK 
denotes business risk, SIZE denote firm’s size, GROW denote growth rate, AGE denotes listing 
years, and STATE denote state ownership structure.
The average value o f total debt ratio (TD) of hospitality firms is 44.5%, much lower than 
the average total debt ratio of all Chinese listed companies, which is 53.07% (Chen & Strange, 
2005). Yet, the figure is close to that of transitional economies, which is 46% (Delcoure, 2007).
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The total debt ratio of hospitality industry is comparable to that of other industries in China. 
According to Liu (1999), the percentage of total debt ratio of manufacturing, trade and 
conglomerate industry are 44.06%, 43.38% and 45.17% respectively.
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Model
Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation
TD .097 1.464 .445 .406 .264
LTD .000 .233 .081 .000 .072
STD .121 1.460 .373 .300 .254
TANG .204 .906 .536 .511 .158
PROF -.274 .190 .042 .042 .079
RISK .003 52.410 3.266 .052 8.847
SIZE 18.764 22.682 20.604 20.510 .820
GROW -.751 .654 .081 .707 .029
AGE .000 13.50 8.188 9.00 4.054
STATE .000 .885 .416 .401 .209
The mean short-term debt ratio (STD) o f listing hospitality companies is 37.3%, while the 
mean of long-term debt ratio (LTD) is 8.10%. It is evident that long-term debt accounts for a 
trivial proportion of all liabilities. The finding is similar to that of Liu (1999) in non-hospitality 
industries in China. This figure o f long-term borrowing lags far behind not only that of G-7
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countries, which is 41%, but also that o f developing countries, which is 22% (Chen, 2003). 
According to Delcoure (2007), the average long-term leverage ratio o f four typical transitional 
economies o f Russia, Poland, Slovakia and Czech Republic is 25.11%, 21.19%, 18.06% and 
16.01% respectively. Kim (1995) used long-term debt to market value equity ratio to measure 
US hospitality corporations’ long-term leverage. According to his study, the mean of long-term 
leverage ratio for US restaurant firms is 1.09, and the mean of long-term leverage ratio for 
lodging firms is 1.597.
Chinese hospitality firms have extremely low long-term debt ratio, because equity financing 
is the main channel for long-term financing. The Chinese banking system is dominated by the 
state government. The state-owned commercial banks contribute most o f loans (Riedel et al., 
2007). Not surprisingly, those loans are lent to state-owned or controlled firms. However, many 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs thereafter) are often not able to re-pay bank loans because of 
their low profitability. In 2004, the amount o f non-performing loans (NPLs) was about S300 
billion or 15% of total outstanding loans according to conservative estimate (Riedel, Jin, & Gao, 
2007). The government is therefore inspiring banks to be more discreet about their lending 
practices so as to lower the bad loan ratio. As a result, banks are reluctant to lend long-term 
loans to corporations, for those loans are harder to monitor than short-term ones. On the other 
hand, corporate bond market hardly exists in China. The value o f corporate bonds merely 
accounts for less than 1% of the country’s GDP, whereas it is 25% of US GDP (as cited in Riedel 
et al., 2007). The issuance of corporate bonds is confined only to SOEs. The issuance process is 
complicated and the standard is strict. In addition, the interest rate of the bonds is regulated 
administratively (Riedel et al., 2007). Given all those restrictions, Chinese corporate bond
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market could hardly be the choice of long-term financing. In the first three quarters o f 2004, the 
issuance amount of corporate bond is 18.5 billion Chinese Yuan, lagging far behind the amount 
of 1145 billion o f the stock. Equity market serves as the major long-term borrower in China 
(Riedel et al., 2007).
The mean of profitability (PROF) is only 4.2%, indicating Chinese hospitality companies 
still have a long way to go to improve their earning ability. Take companies within the hotel 
sector for instance. The recent two decades saw aggressive entry of almost all world renowned 
multinational hotel giants into the Chinese market. Among them, InterContinental Hotel Group, 
Starwood Hotels and Resorts and Accor Hotels are the largest in terms o f property number in 
China (Ball, Homer, & Nield, 2007). Those internationally managed hotels outperform 
domestically managed ones in many industry benchmarks. In 2006, within the five-star category, 
the average daily rate (ADR) and the revenue per available room (RevPAR) o f internationally 
managed hotels are 940 and 629 Chinese Yuan respectively, compared with 563 and 377 Chinese 
Yuan of domestically managed five-star hotels (China Tourist Hotel Association, 2007).
The growth rate (GROW) o f Chinese hospitality enterprises differs. Since the growth rate of 
some firms is negative, it is obvious that though the tourism industry in China is burgeoning, 
some companies have not seized the precious opportunity to develop themselves. Besides, 
business risk (RISK), measured by annual percentage change in operating income, varies greatly 
from one company to another with the standard deviation of 8.847. The tangibility level (TANG) 
of Chinese hospitality firms is relatively high with the mean of 53.6%. The listing years (AGE) 
of most hospitality companies are relatively short, with the mean of slightly over 8 years. Issuing 
equity is a brand new topic to hospitality firms in China, and this explains why the sample set in
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the paper is quite small. The mean proportion of state-owned shares to total company shares 
(STATE) is 41.6%, indicating government is still a significant owner o f hospitality companies 
listed in China.
Pearson Correlation Analysis 
Table 5 presents the findings of the Pearson correlation analysis. In the table, TANG denotes 
asset structure, PROF denotes profitability, RISK denotes business risk, SIZE denote firm size, 
GROW denote growth, AGE denotes listing years, and STATE denote state ownership structure.
Table 5
Findings of the Pearson Correlation Matrix
TANG PROF RISK SIZE GROW AGE STATE
TANG 1
PROF -.435** 1
RISK .086 -.331** 1
SIZE -.029 .365** -.140 1
GROW -.081 .281* .033 -.304** 1
AGE -.032 -.181 .143 .127 -.035 1
STATE -.150 .531** -.210 .515** .091 -.221* 1
Note. * p < .05, ** p <.01, one-tailed.
It can be deduced from the correlation matrix that a hospitality firm with higher level of
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fixed assets and inventoiy has lower profitability. Evidence from the table suggests that the 
lower the business risk, the more profitable is the firm. It also suggests that profitability and the 
proportion of state-owned shares are positively correlated in hospitality field. This result is 
contradictory to previous research which reveals that state ownership has a negative impact on a 
firm’s overall profitability (Liu, 1999). It is obvious that government’s support plays an 
important role in Chinese hospitality companies’ performance. The correlation coefficient also 
points out that a large hospitality firm seems to be more profitable and have more state-owned 
shares.
Findings From OLS Regression Models 
OLS regression analysis for three models of book value total leverage ratio, long-term 
leverage ratio and short-term leverage ratio are run separately in the study. Tables 6, table 7 and 
table 8 present the findings o f OLS regression analysis. Since the observed significance level for 
the F-value is 0.001, 0.001 and 0.009 respectively, it is concluded that the overall utility o f the 
three regression models in explaining the variation in leverage ratios is strong. The R-square for 
the three models are 35.6%, 28.7%, and 29.6%, meaning around 35.6% to 28.7% variation in 
leverage ratios are explained by the three models. The signs of the regression coefficients are 
stable between the three models, except for the variable o f asset structure, firm size and state 
ownership structure.
Often, when two or more independent variables are included in OLS regression model, they 
would contribute overlapping information (McClave, Benson, & Sincich, 2005), and could in 
turn lead to the pitfall of multicollinearity. Once multicollinearity exists, the results of OLS
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regression analysis might be misleading. Variance inflation factor (VIF thereafter) is the 
benchmark to test the severity o f multicollinearity (MeClave et al., 2005). Since all VIF values 
are far below 10 with the highest number of 1.988, multicollinearity should not be considered as 
a problem in this study.
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Table 6
Results o f  OLS Analysis Over Total Leverage Ratio
Model Variable
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
B Std. Error
Standardized
coefficients
Beta
T-stat VIE
1 (Constant) :L895 .901 3.212***
TANG .118 .211 .069 .557 1.260
PROF -1.497 J5 3 -.431 -2.706*** 2.089
RISK -.008 .004 -.246 -2.066** 1.170
SIZE -.118 .047 -.365 -2.527** 1.716
GROW ^53 .157 .196 1.615 1.212
AGE -.006 .012 -.054 -.478 1.064
STATE 489 .205 .066 .434 1.927
R-square .356
Adjusted .271
R-square
F-stat 4.194***
Note. Model 1 reveals the relationship between total leverage ratio and independent variables. 
TANG denotes asset structure, PROF denotes profitability, RISK denotes business risk, SIZE 
denote firm’s size, GROW denote growth rate, AGE denotes listing years, and STATE denote 
state ownership structure.
*p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
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Table 7
Results o f  OLS Analysis Over Long-term Leverage Ratio
Model Variable
Unstandardized
coefficients
Standardized
coefficients T-stat VIF
B Std. Error Beta
2 (Constant) .042 .251 .169
TANG .039 .059 .087 .672 1.260
PROF -498 .154 -.434 -2.589** 2.089
RISK .000 .001 .002 .018 1.170
SIZE .005 .013 .062 .406 1.716
GROW 039 .044 .116 .907 1412
AGE -.007 .003 -462 -2.188** 1.064
STATE
R-square
Adjusted
R-square
F-stat
-.024
487
.193
3.053***
.057 -.069 -.428 1.927
Note. Model 2 reveals the relationship between long-term leverage ratio and independent 
variables. TANG denotes asset structure, PROF denotes profitability, RISK denotes business risk, 
SIZE denote firm’s size, GROW denote growth rate, AGE denotes listing years, and STATE 
denote state ownership structure.
*p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
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Table 8
Results o f  OLS Analysis Over Short-term Leverage Ratio
Model Variable
Unstandardized
coefficients
Standardized 
coefficients T-stat VIF
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) Z578 2.844***
TANG -.030 .906 -.018 -.140 1.260
PROF -1.336 .212 -.400 -2.402** 2.089
RISK -.007 456 -429 -1.834* 1.170
SIZE -.103 .004 -.333 -2.206** 1.716
GROW 408 .047 .168 1.324 1.212
AGE -.001 .158 -.007 -.057 1.064
STATE .027 .012 .021 .131 1.927
R-square 496
Adjusted .203
R-square
F-stat 3.182***
Note. Model 3 reveals the relationship between short-term leverage ratio and independent 
variables. TANG denotes asset structure, PROF denotes profitability, RISK denotes business risk, 
SIZE denote firm’s size, GROW denote growth rate, AGE denotes listing years, and STATE 
denote state ownership structure.
*p< .10. **p<05. ***p<.01.
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Profitability (PROF)
The predictor variable of profitability is consistently negatively correlated with total, 
long-term and short-term leverage ratios at the significance level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.05. The 
result confirms the hypothesis as well as findings o f other financial structure studies done before. 
In developed economies, Friend and Lang (1988) reported similar result exists in US firms. 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) pointed out that there is a negative relation between profitability and 
leverage ratio in Thai companies. After studying all Chinese listed companies in the year of 2003, 
Chen and Strange (2005) drew the conclusion that profitability impacts book value total leverage 
ratio negatively.
The result seems to strongly support the classical pecking order theory. However, the theory 
should not be accepted without reservation. It is evident that there is a revised pecking order 
theory in practice in China (Liu, 1999; Chen, 2004). Firm prefer retained earnings to equity 
financing, and turn to debt financing as last resort. The situation is mainly due to the fact that in 
China, the enforcement of shareholder protection is weak, so equity is regarded as free funds by 
managers (Chen, 2004).
Firm Size (SIZE)
The variable of size has significantly negative influence on both total and short-term 
leverage ratios at the significance level of 0.05. Yet, it has a positive relation with long-term debt 
ratio, though not statistically significant. The outcome implies that large hospitality firms have 
higher long-term leverage ratio, whereas small ones have higher short-term leverage ratio.
Marsh (1982) found the same evidence in a UK setting as well. This could be explained by the 
relatively high transaction costs facing by small hospitality firms when issuing long-term
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financial instruments (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Moreover, high fixed costs o f long-term debts 
are more affordable to large firms (Tang & Jang, 2007).
Although opposed to the proposed hypothesis, the result of negative relationship is not 
surprising, for it is consistent with some empirical research done in the background of both 
developed and developing economies. Timan and Wessels (1988) found small US manufacturing 
firms tend to borrow more short-term debts. Chen and Strange (2005) also found a negative 
relationship between firm size and book value total debt ratio in China, yet not significant. 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983) and Raj an and Zingales (1995), large corporations 
disclose more information to outside investors, and consequently, they have better access to 
equity market, since the information costs associated with equity financing is low. This is 
impetus for large firms to issue equity rather than debts.
Listing Years (AGE)
The variable o f listing years influences long-term leverage ratio in a negative way with the 
significance level of 0.05. It also impacts both total and short-term leverage ratio negatively, yet 
not statistically significant. This result is opposed to the hypothesis. It reveals the fact that the 
older the listing, the less likely that a hospitality company would borrow debts, for it could rely 
on equity financing instead. The longer the listing, the more the investors know about the 
company. Therefore, the firm is able to collect equity with low information cost. According to 
Chen (2004) and Liu (1999), in China, there is a new pecking order in terms of financing in 
which equity financing is more attractive than debt financing. The shareholder protection 
legislation is impotent, so the funds collected through equity financing are regarded as free funds 
by managers.
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Berger and Udell (1998) brought to light that debt ratio decreases as the company become 
more mature, since there is no need for them to turn to debt financing, because they could rely 
on adequate internal funds or equity financing for reinvestment and further growth. It could be 
argued that the hospitality companies included in this study are already in the mature stage of the 
growth cycle, since they have already been listed.
Business Risk (RISK)
Business risk has negative influence on Chinese hospitality companies’ total and short-term 
financial leverage ratios at the significance level of 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. However, it has 
no explanatory power for long-term leverage ratio, since the regression coefficient is 
insignificant. The negative relation supports the hypothesis. Huang and Song (2006) also spotted 
the same result between business volatility and a firm’s market value debt ratio. It supports that 
the trade-off theory works in the Chinese setting, since the concern that financial distress costs 
occur due to the failure to make contractual interests and principal payments would hold 
managers back from borrowing more debts.
Asset Structure (TANG)
The effect o f the determinant of asset structure seems to be ambiguous. Tangibility level has 
a positive impact on total and long-term debt ratios, but negative impact on short-term debt ratio. 
Both impacts are not significant. Companies with high tangibility level borrow more long-term 
debts than short-term ones.
The result, to some extent, supports the previous expectation. On one hand, a Chinese 
hospitality company is more likely to be debt-financed if it comes up with more assets in place 
to serve as collaterals. Chen (2004) found tangibility level has significantly positive correlation
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with leverage ratio, when studying the Chinese listed eompanies. Williamson (1988) also 
reported the same results. On the other hand, since it is even harder to monitor a company with 
fewer fixed assets, the company is supposed to borrow more to reduce agency costs between 
managers and shareholders (Kim, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988).
Growth (GROW!
Growing hospitality companies need more capital and they rely more on both short-term 
and long-term debt financing in China, though the relation is insignificant.
Chen (2004) also found out a positive relation between growth opportunities and debt ratio 
in Chinese context. The author argues that it is the case because both banks and investors 
recognize the value of growth opportunities. Growth opportunities in hospitality field are usually 
tangible, such as property renovation or new property establishment, while common growth 
opportunities in other industries are often intangible, such as R&D (Dalbor & Upneja, 2004). 
Besides, Titman and Wessels (1988) cited evidence from Myers that growth might be found to 
be positively correlated with short-term debt, because the use of more short-term debt would 
mitigate the agency problem. The finding of this study endorses his assumption.
State ownership Structure (STATE)
The influence of state ownership is uncertain according to the findings o f the study. It has 
negative influence on long-term leverage ratio, yet reverse effect on short-term and total debt 
ratios, although none of the relation is statistically significant.
Although the negative sign deviates from the hypothesis, it conforms to Chen and Strange’s 
(2005) result. State, as the significant shareholder of most listed hospitality corporations in 
China, would like to escape debt financing to avoid financial distress costs. Zeckhauser and
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Pound (1990) found a negative relationship between the presence o f large shareholders and firm 
leverage as well. Besides, since in China, state-owned enterprises’ managers and board members 
are appointed and monitored closely by the government, there is no need to depend on debt 
financing to mitigate the agency problem between managers and shareholders.
On the other hand, the positive sign corroborates Berger and Udell’s (1994) assumption that 
a close relationship with creditors substitute for collateral when borrowing. However, the close 
relationship leads to less borrowing expenses only when company borrows short-term debts.
50
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusion
This research is a preliminary effort in attempting to analyze the determinants o f financial 
structure of Chinese hospitality firms. After studying the relationship between three leverage 
ratios and seven important indicators suggested by theoretical or empirical studies, the major 
findings are presented as follows.
The most significant variable for the three leverage ratios is profitability. The predictor has 
strong negative impacts on firm’s total, long-term and short-term leverage ratio with the 
significance level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.05 respectively. Hospitality firm facing great business 
risk borrows much less than others. The regression coefficient o f the indicator o f firm size is 
negative and is significant at the level o f 0.05 for both total and short-term leverage models. 
Also, a hospitality firm with long listing years is less likely to borrow long-term debts. Overall, 
the signs o f regression coefficients are consistent among three models of total leverage, 
long-term leverage and short-term leverage, except for the variable o f asset structure, firm size 
and state ownership structure. A Chinese hospitality firm with more assets in place tends to 
borrow more long-term debts than short-term ones. Firm size positively correlates with total 
and short-term debt ratios, but inversely relates to long-term debt ratio. Hospitality firm hold 
higher state-owned shares opt to have more short-term borrowing than long-term debt
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financing.
Conventional financial structure theories established on the basis of developed economies 
are applicable to Chinese hospitality companies, but their explanatory power is limited to some 
extent. This critical finding validates the results of relevant research studies done either in 
developing or transitional economies (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001; 
Delcoure, 2007). Evidence reveals that the determinant of business risk fails to explain 
long-term debt financing decisions, and leverage ratios increase slightly with the factor of 
growth, contradictory to the hypothesis. Table 9 presents the comparison between the 
hypotheses made in the third chapter and the actual results obtained from Chinese hospitality 
companies.
On one hand, it brings to light that listed Chinese hospitality firms are operating as 
market-oriented firms in developed economies. Despite still in strong grip of the government, 
they are profit-maximizing enterprises. On the other hand, it also highlights that Chinese 
hospitality companies hold distinctive features that are deviate from the underpinnings of 
conventional financial structure theories. First of all, since conventional financial structure 
theories are developed to explain long-term debt financing behavior, their explanatory power 
suffer greatly given that Chinese hospitality firms’ long-term borrowing ratio is extremely low, 
with the average of only 8.1%. Moreover, financial structure theories are constructed on the 
basis of financial structure evidence of a wide variety o f industries. Obviously, they do not take 
into consideration any industry specific factor. In most industries, growth opportunities are 
generally intangible assets, but in hospitality field, growth opportunities, such as property 
renovations, are tangible assets (Dalbor & Upneja, 2004). It explains the positive effect of
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growth on debt borrowing.
Table 9
Comparison Between Hypotheses and Actual Results
Determinant
Expected regression 
coefficients sign
Actual regression 
coefficients sign
Asset structure + +/-
Profitability -
Business risk - _**
Firm size + +/.**
Growth rate - +
Listing years + _**
State ownership structure + +/-
Note. “+” means that leverage increases with the determinant, means that leverage decreases 
with the determinant, and means that both positive and negative relation between leverage 
and the determinant are identified by the study.
*p<.05. **p<.01.
Study Implication
This research is the very first financial structure study concerning Chinese hospitality 
companies. It contributes to the extant body o f knowledge about Chinese corporate financial 
structure by examining the determinants of financial structure in a Chinese hospitality setting.
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The findings o f the study affirm that determinants proposed or proved to be useful in explaining 
corporate financial structure of developed countries impact Chinese hospitality companies as 
well.
Chinese hospitality companies’ average debt borrowing is low, especially in terms of 
long-term debt financing. A profitable hospitality company is supposed to borrow less, 
especially when it faces great business risks. The variable of size impacts firm’s total and 
short-term leverage ratio in a negative way. Besides, the research also reveals that the older the 
listing, the less long-term debts a hospitality company relies on, since it could turn to 
self-financing or equity financing as a better option. Investors could draw on the findings o f the 
study before designing their own financial structure.
Limitation
It has been suggested that prospective domestic and international hospitality investors may 
draw on the findings of the paper to get an insight into the typical financial structure of Chinese 
hospitality firms. Nonetheless, it should be noted that since there is an inevitable bias resulting 
from sample selection, the results of the study must be interpreted with great caution.
First of all, all listed companies have undertaken recapitalization according to the 
standards formulated by China Securities Regulatory Commission before obtaining IPO 
permission (Liu, 1999). Hence, their financial structure may converge to some extent. Besides, 
most listed companies in China are large or medium-sized ones with higher profitability level. 
They are not representatives of all hospitality companies in China. The findings of the study may 
not necessarily apply to small or privately owned hospitality firms which may have special
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restrictions on their financial structure, such as restrictive loan covenants (Andrew, Damitio, & 
Schmidgall, 2007). In China, firms in private sector have very limited access to debt financing 
through state-owned commercial banks or corporate bonds (Neftci & Menager-Xu, 2007). It 
must be taken into consideration that private and public sector in China differ greatly in terms of 
financing ability and capacity.
Recommendation for Further Study 
Although the R-square and adjusted R-square o f the study are comparable with other similar 
studies o f Chen & Strange (2005), Supanvanij (2006) and Huang and Song (2006), they are still 
not very satisfying. It suggests that some variation in debt financing still remains unexplained. In 
the future study, researchers are recommended to employ alternative methods to measure 
financial structure determinants. Some industry specific variables, such as average daily rate 
(ADR), occupancy rate or revenue per available room (RevPar) are believed to better reflect 
growth o f a hospitality company than those more general measurement like sales growth (Tang 
& Jang, 2007). The study methodology could also be extended to investigate financial structure 
o f individual lodging or restaurant properties.
The number o f publicly traded restaurant and lodging firms is too small for a meaningful 
regression analysis. Currently, there are only two restaurant companies and five hotel companies 
traded on Chinese stock market. When the available data sample is large enough, it is advisable 
to separate companies according to their sub-sectors when doing financial structure analysis, 
because different industry sub-sector has its own unique features which have impact on financial 
structure decisions. For example, lodging industry is known by its fixed asset intensiveness and
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seasonality.
Finally, it is ideal if the data of market value of debts are available. Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Kim (1995) and Supanvanij (2006) all suggest that using market value o f debts is a more 
accurate way than book value to measure firm’s leverage ratio.
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